Citing Ukrainian intelligence reports, Zelenskyy stated that Russia is preparing a new wave of conscription for the fall. According to these reports, several hundred thousand people could be mobilized by the end of 2026, with a comparable number possibly following in 2027. This plan has not yet been confirmed. Russian government officials have not announced any new mobilization. Rather, former President and current Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council, Dmitry Medvedev, claimed that in the first half of 2026 alone, 200,000 volunteers had signed military contracts. These figures cannot be independently verified. Reuters reported on Zelenskyy’s warning and the Russian response.

Nevertheless, another mobilization appears possible. According to estimates by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Russia lost between 30,000 and 34,000 soldiers per month in 2026 due to death, injury, or being reported missing. Monthly recruitment, by contrast, was estimated at approximately 27,000 people. These figures are estimates, not confirmed Russian data. However, they highlight the fundamental problem: Russia continues to deploy large numbers of personnel and equipment but is making only slow and extremely costly territorial gains. Drones, minefields, and fortified defensive positions have turned large sections of the front into deadly zones. The underlying CSIS analysis was published in July 2026. Under these conditions, more soldiers do not automatically mean a military breakthrough. Without better training, leadership, and protection against drones, a new mobilization could primarily increase the number of casualties.

The partial mobilization in September 2022 alone triggered protests in Russia and a massive exodus. Hundreds of thousands of people—primarily men of conscription age—left the country at that time, at least temporarily. Reuters documented the exodus and the protests at the time. Another draft could deprive Russia of urgently needed labor, place a strain on families, and intensify dissatisfaction with the war. Whether this will lead to open resistance, however, remains uncertain. The Kremlin has significantly restricted opportunities for protest and independent reporting in recent years.

In parallel with the mobilization debate, Ukraine is increasing military pressure in the Black Sea. According to Ukrainian reports, several Russian warships were damaged during a major attack on Novorossiysk on August 12. The Ukrainian General Staff initially reported that four ships had been hit, including the frigates “Admiral Makarov” and “Admiral Essen.” The exact extent of the damage has not yet been independently confirmed. Novorossiysk is not only an important base for the Russian Black Sea Fleet but also a major transshipment hub for grain and oil. Two large grain terminals had to temporarily suspend operations following the attack. Reuters confirmed the attacks on port facilities and reported on Ukrainian claims regarding damaged warships.

According to Russian regional governor Veniamin Kondratyev, three people were killed in the attacks in the region, including an eight-year-old child. At least 24 others were reportedly injured. These casualty figures come from Russian authorities. The Associated Press also reported on the civilian casualties and damage in Novorossiysk. The following night, Mikhail Razvozhayev, the Moscow-appointed governor of Sevastopol, reported another power outage following Ukrainian drone attacks. The extent of the damage in Crimea—which is occupied by Russia and was annexed in 2014 in violation of international law—was still being assessed.

The Ukrainian attacks are reportedly targeting Russian supply routes, military bases, warships, and energy facilities. Kyiv aims to disrupt the Russian armed forces’ supply lines and increase the economic costs of the war.

However, attacks on ports used for military purposes can also affect civilians and jeopardize international supply chains. The war, which began in 2014 and escalated with Russia’s major offensive on February 24, 2022, is therefore not limited to the front lines. It is reaching ports, power plants, residential buildings—and, with increasing frequency, people living far behind the actual combat zones.

The frequently cited claim that a Russian soldier survives on average only 20 to 30 minutes on the front lines should not be presented as a generally accepted statistic. It stems from a statement by CIA Director John Ratcliffe and referred to an intelligence estimate for newly arriving Russian recruits—until their death or wounding on the battlefield. There is no independently verifiable calculation for all soldiers and front-line sectors. Defense News documented Ratcliffe’s statement.